Two sibling escalation tiers above the audit-only ethics baseline, both opt-in per commitment via the ethics pack JSON. ADR-0037 — refusal_commitments - EthicsPack.refusal_commitments (frozenset[str]; subset of commitment_ids; validated at load time, unknown id rejected) - Generic refusal prefix: "I cannot proceed — boundary violated: " - Source-tagged refusal ids: "safety:<id>" / "ethics:<id>" - build_refusal_surface now takes (safety_verdict, ethics_verdict, ethics_pack); ADR-0036 single-arg call remains valid back-compat - Default pack ships refusal_commitments: [] — audit-only floor preserved - Re-ratified default pack (mastery sha changes with schema field) ADR-0038 — hedge_commitments - EthicsPack.hedge_commitments (sibling field; same validator) - Mutually exclusive with refusal_commitments at load time - Runtime prepends manifold's preferred_hedge_soft (fallback preferred_hedge_strong) when an opted-in commitment fires runtime-checkable - Refusal supersedes hedge globally; stub path skips hedge (already a disclosure surface); main path only - Idempotent on prefix (case-insensitive) — defends against ADR-0028 assembler hedges - Does NOT flip _last_refusal_was_typed — hedge is not refusal Surface contract: - ChatResponse.walk_surface + articulation_surface preserved unchanged on both refusal and hedge paths (same audit discipline as ADR-0036) - Only user-facing ChatResponse.surface (and TurnEvent.surface on main path) is mutated Files: - packs/ethics/loader.py — refusal_commitments + hedge_commitments fields; _validate_opt_in_subset; mutual-exclusion check - packs/ethics/default_general_ethics_v1.json — both opt-in lists empty; re-ratified - chat/refusal.py — generic prefix, source-tagged ids, violated_runtime_checkable_ethics, should_inject_hedge, build_hedge_prefix, inject_hedge - chat/runtime.py — passes ethics_verdict + ethics_pack to refusal builder; hedge injection branch after refusal check - tests/test_ethics_refusal_opt_in.py (new) — 16 tests - tests/test_hedge_injection.py (new) — 22 tests - docs/decisions/ADR-0037-per-predicate-ethics-refusal.md (new) - docs/decisions/ADR-0038-hedge-injection.md (new) Verification: - Combined pack-layer suite: 154 green (was 116 after ADR-0036) - CLI suites unchanged: smoke 67, runtime 19, cognition 121 - core eval cognition: intent 100%, versor_closure 100% (baseline)
132 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
132 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
# ADR-0037: Per-Predicate Ethics Refusal Opt-In
|
|
|
|
**Status:** Accepted (2026-05-17)
|
|
**Author:** Joshua Shay + planner pass
|
|
**Companion docs:** [`ADR-0033-ethics-packs.md`](ADR-0033-ethics-packs.md), [`ADR-0034-ethics-check-surface.md`](ADR-0034-ethics-check-surface.md), [`ADR-0036-safety-refusal-policy.md`](ADR-0036-safety-refusal-policy.md)
|
|
|
|
## Context
|
|
|
|
ADR-0036 wired typed refusal for safety violations only. Ethics
|
|
violations were left audit-only because:
|
|
|
|
1. The pack layer's swappability semantics meant a pack-author flag
|
|
could silently change refusal behavior on every deployment.
|
|
2. Empirical violation rates for individual ethics commitments did
|
|
not yet exist.
|
|
|
|
ADR-0036's deferred follow-up was *per-predicate ethics refusal*: a
|
|
mechanism by which a pack author can opt **specific** commitments
|
|
into refusal one at a time, without flipping a global ethics-refuses
|
|
switch. That coupling is what this ADR introduces.
|
|
|
|
## Decision
|
|
|
|
Add an optional `refusal_commitments` field to the ethics pack JSON
|
|
schema. Each entry must already appear in `commitment_ids`. At
|
|
runtime, an ethics commitment contributes to typed refusal only when
|
|
*both*:
|
|
|
|
1. Its predicate fired `runtime_checkable=True, upheld=False`.
|
|
2. Its id appears in `EthicsPack.refusal_commitments`.
|
|
|
|
The default pack ships with an **empty** `refusal_commitments`.
|
|
Audit-only is the floor; opt-in is the ceiling.
|
|
|
|
### Surface format change
|
|
|
|
The refusal prefix is generalised from
|
|
`"I cannot proceed — safety boundary violated: "` to
|
|
`"I cannot proceed — boundary violated: "`, and contributing ids are
|
|
**source-tagged**:
|
|
|
|
* `safety:<boundary_id>`
|
|
* `ethics:<commitment_id>`
|
|
|
|
Source tags disambiguate sibling namespaces and avoid name collisions
|
|
between the two pack types. Lex order is preserved across the merged
|
|
list.
|
|
|
|
### Pack-loader bounds
|
|
|
|
`packs/ethics/loader.py` now validates `refusal_commitments`:
|
|
|
|
* Optional; defaults to empty.
|
|
* Must be a list of strings if present.
|
|
* Every entry must be a declared `commitment_id` (typo → load-time
|
|
error; silent typos would be catastrophic given the behavioral
|
|
consequences).
|
|
* No duplicates.
|
|
|
|
The validator is shared with ADR-0038 (`_validate_opt_in_subset`) and
|
|
will be reused for `hedge_commitments`.
|
|
|
|
### Ratification
|
|
|
|
Adding a field to the pack invalidates its prior mastery-report seal.
|
|
The default pack was re-ratified through
|
|
`scripts/ratify_ethics_pack.py` (idempotent re-run); the new
|
|
`mastery_report_sha256` reflects the schema addition.
|
|
|
|
### Backward compatibility
|
|
|
|
`build_refusal_surface(safety_verdict)` (the ADR-0036 single-arg
|
|
form) still works — with no ethics pack supplied, ethics contributes
|
|
nothing. Existing safety-only tests pass unchanged because their
|
|
assertions are substring-based on the boundary id (now appearing as
|
|
`safety:<id>`).
|
|
|
|
## Consequences
|
|
|
|
### Positive
|
|
|
|
* **Audit-only remains the default.** An operator who clones the
|
|
default pack and deploys gets ADR-0036 behavior unchanged.
|
|
* **Per-commitment granularity.** A medical-domain pack can opt
|
|
`defer_high_stakes_to_human_review` into refusal without flipping
|
|
the rest of the ethics surface.
|
|
* **Schema-enforced safety.** Typos in `refusal_commitments` fail
|
|
at load time, not at the first matching violation.
|
|
* **Unified refusal surface.** Auditors see one refusal text per
|
|
turn covering both safety and ethics violations, with source tags.
|
|
|
|
### Negative / risks
|
|
|
|
* **Pack mutation invalidates ratification.** A deployment that
|
|
edits `refusal_commitments` must re-ratify. This is the intended
|
|
cost: opting commitments into refusal is a deployment-level
|
|
decision that deserves the ratification round-trip.
|
|
* **The opt-in list is JSON, which means it sits inside the swappable
|
|
layer.** This is correct semantically (refusal policy *is* a
|
|
deployment choice) but means an operator can flip refusal on/off
|
|
by editing a file. Mitigated by: ratification round-trip,
|
|
schema validation, and the load-time error for unknown ids.
|
|
* **Surface prefix changed.** Downstream consumers parsing the
|
|
refusal text by exact prefix needed an update. We chose to update
|
|
the constant in place rather than maintain a parallel API because
|
|
no in-tree consumer existed.
|
|
|
|
## Verification
|
|
|
|
* `tests/test_ethics_refusal_opt_in.py` — 16 tests covering:
|
|
loader bounds (empty default, unknown id rejected, duplicate
|
|
rejected, non-list rejected); pure builder paths (no opt-in →
|
|
no refusal, opt-in + violation → refusal, opt-in subset
|
|
semantics, non-runtime-checkable ignored, combined safety+ethics,
|
|
ADR-0036 back-compat); helper `violated_runtime_checkable_ethics`;
|
|
ChatRuntime integration (default pack does not refuse, mutated
|
|
pack refuses, combined safety+ethics in runtime).
|
|
* Combined pack-layer suite: **132 tests, all green**.
|
|
* CLI suites: smoke 67, runtime 19, cognition 121 — unchanged.
|
|
|
|
## Open questions deferred to a future ADR
|
|
|
|
1. **Pack-schema-driven hedge injection.** Sibling field
|
|
`hedge_commitments` follows in ADR-0038 — same opt-in pattern,
|
|
different remediation.
|
|
2. **Mutual exclusion between `refusal_commitments` and
|
|
`hedge_commitments`.** Encoded at load time in ADR-0038.
|
|
3. **Per-domain default policies.** Should the medical-domain pack
|
|
ship with `defer_high_stakes_to_human_review` opted into refusal
|
|
by default? Deferred until a medical pack actually exists.
|
|
4. **Telemetry split by source.** A future telemetry sink may want
|
|
to count safety refusals and ethics refusals separately.
|