core/core/ratified_ledger.py
Claude 71bf04fb44
feat(provenance,teaching): close the lateral gaps the assessment actually found
Squashes the arc's work into one commit; the workflow-file edit it originally
carried is excluded (see the end of this message).

## Lane 1 — Workbench recorded a proved answer as ungrounded

With deduction_serving_enabled ratified ON (ADR-0256), workbench/api.py's live
chat route builds a bare ChatRuntime(), so the deduction composer decides
Workbench turns and stamps grounding_source="deduction" — but
_coerce_grounding_source carried a hand-copied whitelist of the six pre-arc
labels and silently rewrote anything else to "none". The runtime comment
reasoned this was inert because "REPL turns do not flow through Workbench's
CognitivePipelineRecord path". True, and irrelevant: the traffic flows the
other way. Stale since 2026-07-24.

Scope is one field. workbench/api.py:818 prefers TurnEvent.epistemic_state,
which read epistemic_state_needed — honest. So the UNregistered path degraded
honestly while the hand-copied whitelist asserted a falsehood; a second copy of
a closed enum was worse than no copy. Hence registration AND derivation:
GROUNDING_SOURCES exposes the Literal's members, and the coercion reads it.
workbench-ui badges/tokens/snapshot follow; enumCoverage.test.ts forces atomicity.

## Lane 2 — the ratification ceremony

The discovery loop was instrumented but not closed. teaching/ratification.py
turns a reviewed decision into a chain record, a corpus commit, and a receipt.

Its design turns on one observation: _ratified_rows DROPS unadmissible rows
silently — correct when serving, a trap when ratifying, because the file grows,
the commit lands, and the band count does not move. So the ceremony refuses to
call an append a ratification until it has re-read the curriculum through the
real loader and seen the chain arrive; a non-admitted append is rolled back.
Validation is a pre-flight courtesy, admission is the proof.

Arena queue entry and ledger reseal are deliberately NOT performed (bridge rule
1); the receipt names them. Front door: `core proposal-queue ratify`, a sibling
of `review` rather than a flag on it.

## Lane 3 — structural closures

- ADR-0263 gains rule 5: absence policy is DECLARED in CAPABILITY_LEDGERS, not
  passed at the call site. An AST-matched test fails if a serving path passes
  missing_ok again.
- Deductive suite added WHOLE to the pre-push gate: 285 tests in 29s against
  smoke's 216 in 62s, so no coverage trade was needed.
- Smoke/CI parity assertion made bidirectional. It was one-directional, and had
  drifted.
- test_prior_surface_deduction_binding.py pins correction binding on the
  deduction path. The review's diagnosis did NOT reproduce — hash_surface moves
  in lockstep — so it pins what is there. Mutation-checked.
- Domain-keyed ADR index over 312 flat-numbered files, explicitly partial.
- Arc-close brief template, plus this arc's own brief filled in against it.

## Lanes 4 and 5 — two premises falsified by measurement, one of them mine

Math 4.2: baseline reproduced (correct=5 wrong=0 refused=495); all four named
cases traced to one seam with each gap isolated by one-variable probes. Then the
number that changes the recommendation: the gap blocking case 0000 affects 1
case in 500, the 'than' gap blocking 0001 affects 2. ADR-0251's prohibition on
per-case growth now rests on a count. No reader change made.

CGA: versor_condition is 0.22% of a turn, not the "~10x proof latency" I claimed
— that multiplied an isolated microbenchmark by a call count and compared it to
a single verdict's latency. The real cost is geometric_product at 33,986
calls/turn (~73%) via cga_inner in search paths. The obvious closed form is NOT
bit-exact (954/4000 in f32); backend.vault_recall's serial fold IS (3000/3000,
worst-rel 0) and is the correct target. cargo test could not run —
static.crates.io is denied by the sandbox network policy — so the Rust parity
question stays open and the typestate lane is carried forward, not shipped
uncompiled.

## Not landed: three lines owed to .github/workflows/smoke.yml

The CI smoke gate is narrower than the local one —
test_pack_draft_serve_boundary.py (ADR-0253 INV-33) has been local-only, unseen
because the parity pin checked one direction. The edit was authored and rejected
at push for lacking the `workflow` OAuth scope, so it is recorded as a named,
dated PENDING_IN_CI exception rather than dropped: the assertion still fires on
any new divergence, and a second guard fires once the three land.

[Verification]: pre-push gates all green — smoke 236 passed, warmed_session 10
passed, deductive 285 passed. Ratification 14, ADR index 5, CLI suites 10.
Grounding/epistemic sweep 741 passed 1 skipped. workbench-ui 598 passed across
73 files, tsc -b clean. capability index 11 passed, digest unchanged. Math
holdout correct=5 wrong=0 refused=495. Committed chain corpora byte-unchanged
after the tests that write to them.
Environment caveat: the repo pins requires-python ==3.12.13, which uv cannot
fetch for linux-x86_64, so `uv sync --locked` fails. All Python runs used a
scratch venv on 3.12.11 with declared deps — not the locked universe, not the
full ~12k suite. The pin was left untouched. Re-run on a 3.12.13 host before
treating this as merge evidence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FduW6Krm3PPQv3P5iwBYtx
2026-07-25 04:51:15 +00:00

241 lines
9.1 KiB
Python

"""The ratified-ledger bridge — seal → ratify → SHA-verify → serve-gate.
ADR-0175 Phase 5's consumption bridge (generalization plan Phase 3.3),
extracted from three working instances rather than designed ahead of them:
- ``generate/determine/estimation_license.py`` (ADR-0175, the first)
- ``chat/deduction_serve_license.py`` (ADR-0256, the second)
- ``chat/curriculum_serve_license.py`` (ADR-0262, the third)
All three had converged on the same artifact and the same four rules, which is
what makes this an extraction and not a speculation. The rules, stated once:
1. **The engine reads; only sealed practice writes.** A ledger is the output
of a practice run over a gold corpus, never of a serving turn. Nothing in a
serving path may call :func:`write_sealed_ledger`.
2. **Tamper-evidence is structural.** The artifact carries
``content_sha256`` over its ``classes`` table; a load that cannot reproduce
it REFUSES. A hand-edited ledger is not a slightly-wrong ledger, it is an
unratified one.
3. **Ceilings are not negotiable at the call site.** The gate always runs at
the safe defaults unless a caller passes ceilings explicitly, and no
production path does — ADR-0175 invariant #4: an engine cannot raise its own
bar.
4. **Absent evidence is never a license.** A class missing from the ledger
yields ``None``, and every caller's ``None`` branch serves the disclosed
(hedged) surface. A capability with no track record is served honestly, not
withheld and not asserted.
Byte-compatibility is deliberate: :func:`seal_artifact` and
:func:`write_sealed_ledger` reproduce the exact bytes the three existing
sealers wrote, so adopting the bridge re-seals every committed ledger
identically and no lane pin moves.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
from core.reliability_gate import (
Action,
Ceilings,
ClassTally,
LicenseDecision,
license_for,
)
from formation.hashing import sha256_of
class RatifiedLedgerError(ValueError):
"""A committed ledger is malformed or does not verify against its own hash."""
_PROJECT_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
class LedgerSpec:
"""One capability's committed ledger, and whether its absence is an error."""
capability: str
path: Path
#: ``False`` — this capability SHIPS with a sealed ledger, so a missing file
#: means a broken deployment and the load must refuse.
#: ``True`` — this capability's practice volume is still being built, so a
#: missing file honestly means "nothing earned yet" and serves disclosed.
missing_ok: bool
note: str
#: Rule 5 of the bridge: **absence policy is declared, not passed.**
#:
#: Rules 1-4 (docstring above) are all enforced structurally; this one was not.
#: ``missing_ok`` began life as a ``load_sealed_ledger`` keyword, which meant
#: each adapter chose its own answer to "is a missing ledger a broken
#: deployment, or an unearned capability?" — a question about the capability,
#: not about the call. Any new subject onboarding through the bridge could pass
#: ``missing_ok=True`` and silently downgrade a should-be-hard-refuse into a
#: disclosed hedge, and nothing would catch it.
#:
#: Declaring it here means adding a capability is a manifest edit that a
#: reviewer reads as a policy change, which is what it is. The keyword survives
#: on the primitive for tests and one-off tooling; no production adapter passes
#: it.
CAPABILITY_LEDGERS: dict[str, LedgerSpec] = {
"estimation": LedgerSpec(
capability="estimation",
path=_PROJECT_ROOT / "generate" / "determine" / "data" / "estimation_ledger.json",
missing_ok=False,
note="ADR-0175 — ships sealed with the converse-estimation gate.",
),
"deduction_serve": LedgerSpec(
capability="deduction_serve",
path=_PROJECT_ROOT / "chat" / "data" / "deduction_serve_ledger.json",
missing_ok=False,
note="ADR-0256 — ships sealed; 25 bands at 720/720 wrong=0.",
),
"curriculum_serve": LedgerSpec(
capability="curriculum_serve",
path=_PROJECT_ROOT / "chat" / "data" / "curriculum_serve_ledger.json",
missing_ok=True,
note=(
"ADR-0262 §5 — no band has earned a license from present curriculum "
"volume; every served band is DISCLOSED. Flips to False when the "
"first band earns SERVE and the ledger is committed."
),
),
}
def ledger_spec(capability: str) -> LedgerSpec:
"""The declared spec for *capability*, or a refusal naming the manifest."""
try:
return CAPABILITY_LEDGERS[capability]
except KeyError:
raise RatifiedLedgerError(
f"unregistered ledger capability: {capability!r} — declare it in "
"core.ratified_ledger.CAPABILITY_LEDGERS before consuming it"
) from None
def load_capability_ledger(capability: str) -> dict[str, ClassTally]:
"""Load the committed ledger for *capability* under its declared policy.
The production entry point. A caller names what it is, not how absence
should be treated — so no call site can grant itself a softer failure mode
than the capability was registered with.
"""
spec = ledger_spec(capability)
return load_sealed_ledger(spec.path, missing_ok=spec.missing_ok)
def tally_dict(tally: ClassTally) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""The committed per-class row. The field set is the contract — a reader
of an older ledger must be able to name every field it finds."""
return {
"correct": tally.correct,
"wrong": tally.wrong,
"refused": tally.refused,
"t2_verified": tally.t2_verified,
"t2_agrees_gold": tally.t2_agrees_gold,
}
def seal_artifact(
ledger: dict[str, ClassTally], *, schema: str, note: str, provenance: str
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""The self-verifying sealed-ledger dict for *ledger*.
Classes are sorted, so the artifact is a pure function of the practice
result: the same corpus and solver seal byte-identically, which is what
makes a committed ledger reviewable as a diff.
"""
classes = {name: tally_dict(tally) for name, tally in sorted(ledger.items())}
return {
"schema": schema,
"classes": classes,
"content_sha256": sha256_of(classes),
"note": note,
"provenance": provenance,
}
def write_sealed_ledger(path: Path, artifact: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Write *artifact* to *path* in the committed formatting."""
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path.write_text(
json.dumps(artifact, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n", encoding="utf-8"
)
return artifact
def load_sealed_ledger(path: Path, *, missing_ok: bool = False) -> dict[str, ClassTally]:
"""Load + verify a sealed ledger → per-class ``ClassTally``.
``missing_ok`` distinguishes two genuinely different situations. A ledger
that a capability *ships with* is required: its absence means the
deployment is broken, and refusing is right. A ledger for a capability
whose practice volume is still being built is legitimately absent, and the
honest reading of "no file" is "no class has earned anything yet" — an
empty table, every answer disclosed. Neither case may be answered by
guessing a license.
"""
if not path.exists():
if missing_ok:
return {}
raise RatifiedLedgerError(f"ratified ledger not found: {path}")
try:
artifact = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
raise RatifiedLedgerError(f"cannot read ratified ledger: {exc}") from exc
classes = artifact.get("classes") if isinstance(artifact, dict) else None
if not isinstance(classes, dict):
raise RatifiedLedgerError("ratified ledger has no 'classes' table")
if sha256_of(classes) != artifact.get("content_sha256"):
raise RatifiedLedgerError(
"ratified ledger content_sha256 mismatch — not the sealed-practice output"
)
return {
name: ClassTally(
class_name=name,
correct=int(counts.get("correct", 0)),
wrong=int(counts.get("wrong", 0)),
refused=int(counts.get("refused", 0)),
t2_verified=int(counts.get("t2_verified", 0)),
t2_agrees_gold=int(counts.get("t2_agrees_gold", 0)),
)
for name, counts in classes.items()
}
def serve_license(
class_name: str,
ledger: dict[str, ClassTally],
*,
ceilings: Ceilings | None = None,
) -> LicenseDecision | None:
"""The ``Action.SERVE`` verdict for *class_name*, or ``None`` when the
class has no committed evidence (never a license — rule 4)."""
tally = ledger.get(class_name)
if tally is None:
return None
return license_for(tally, Action.SERVE, ceilings or Ceilings.default())
__all__ = [
"CAPABILITY_LEDGERS",
"LedgerSpec",
"RatifiedLedgerError",
"ledger_spec",
"load_capability_ledger",
"load_sealed_ledger",
"seal_artifact",
"serve_license",
"tally_dict",
"write_sealed_ledger",
]